# 1NC

#### I negate that wealthy nations have an obligation to provide development assistance to other nations.

## Part 1 is Framing

### Standard

#### 1. Nations only have a prima facia duty to their own citizens as per the social contract. Each state was only created to protect the safety and wellbeing of the people who created it, and thus their sole obligation is only to their own citizens. This directly negates their obligation offense. Basas 16:

Basas, Richard. “Protecting Citizens, Vulnerable Groups and The Social Contract.” Foreign Policy Blogs, 26 July 2016, foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/07/26/citizens-social-contract/.

While there have been many theories on how individuals are to be treated by their government, one of the more consistent approaches surrounds how individuals will give up the majority of their personal protection to the state in exchange for good government and wide ranging protections for **the** entire community. This **social contract outlines the responsibility of government in** modern democratic **societies is to keep their citizenry safe and healthy** within reasonable measures. **This** philosophy **forms the legal** and constitutional **basis for how governments are obligated to protect its citizens**, and it is generally accepted that breaking this socially and culturally accepted agreement is a legal and constitutional violation of an individual’s rights. Extending to 2016, the attack that took place in Nice when a terrorist ran down several people during Bastille Day celebrations was the third major terrorist incident in France in the last 18 months. Reports detail how at the ceremony for victims of the attack, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls was booed by the attending mourners. The general sentiment seems to be that the French government is no longer able, or perhaps willing, to protect its citizens. The inability for the government to protect French citizens may have been assumed by many after a speech where Valls suggested that such attacks will become more common in the future. **Any violation of the obligation to protect**, or breaking of **a social agreement** that a government has the complete obligation **to protect its citizens is** often **seen as a break in** the social fabric of any **modern society**. **The** moral **basis in the social contract creates a situation** where the knowledge of any violation would elicit a natural negative response by any citizen, especially those who feel they no longer are being protected by the government that is obligated to ensure their safety. The right to have protection goes beyond that of state citizens and is applied towards visiting nationals, in-state refugees and may even go as far as having an obligation to protect vulnerable groups abroad as well. A discussion in Canada’s capital this week focused on how admitting refugees and protecting citizens abroad should be applied to the most vulnerable as many of the targeted groups are from minority communities **with no state protection in foreign countries**. The debate surrounding bringing in ethnic minorities who are being singled out and exterminated is to acknowledge the genocide taking place against them because of who they are, and to direct protection towards these groups as their local governments are unwilling or unable to prevent a genocide. The resistance by government officials against focusing in on minority groups and giving them unique assistance is argued by some as a violation of a right to have protection when Canada or another nation giving aid is addressing genocide in foreign countries. Many citizens of Canada are disturbed to find out that many of these targeted groups are still largely ignored by their aid. As what could be described as the most important issue of our time, the moral obligation to enforce the social contract as it relates to protecting individuals is as strong as it has ever been. A government that is not willing to accept that reality is one that has neglected its obligation to its citizens and vulnerable groups at the edge of extinction.

#### 2. Humans have an inescapable desire for power which defines politics in the real world and is the inherent cause of conflict. Because of this every nation will always take actions in their own interests – it’s a constitutive feature of a nation. Karpowicz 17:

Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.

**International moral norms are imposed on other countries by dominant nations** or groups of nations that present themselves as the international community as a whole. **They are invented to perpetuate those nations’ dominance**. **Values that idealists view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and international order, are** regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions. The powers that are satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to rally everyone around their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special **vested interest of predominant powers**” (76). On the other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, **and** so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied powers. “Those who **profit most by** [international] order can in the longer run only hope to maintain **it** by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least” (152). The logical conclusion to be drawn by the reader of Carr’s book is the policy of appeasement. Carr was a sophisticated thinker. He recognized himself that the logic of “pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the current utopia” of idealism, he at the same time attempts to build “a new utopia,” a realist world order (ibid.). Thus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental, universally acknowledged norms and values, and contradicts his own argument by which he tries to deny universality to any norms or values. To make further objections, the fact that the language of universal moral values can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such values can only be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist. There is a deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not pay enough attention to the reality of power. On the other hand, in the world of pure realism, in which all values are made relative to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable. The Twenty Years’ Crisis touches on a number of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of its time. While we can fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge. Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a country like any other. He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatisfied power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be satisfied by territorial concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter was to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in September 1939 by Poland alone. A theory of international relations is not just an intellectual enterprise; it has practical consequences. It influences our thinking and political practice. On the practical side, the realists of the 1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual support, were people opposed to the system of collective security embodied in the League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy establishments of the day, they contributed to its weakness. Once they had weakened the League, they pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an alternative to collective security (Ashworth 46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the failure of the anti-League realist conservatives gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of this policy became clear, they tried to rebuild the very security system they had earlier demolished. Those who supported collective security were labeled idealists. 2.2 Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Principles Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of human existence. **The insatiable human lust for power**, timeless **and** universal, which he identifies with animus dominandi, **the desire to dominate**, **is for him the main cause of conflict**. As he asserts in his main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (25). Morgenthau systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles that he includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations. As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a useful tool of foreign policy. The keystone of Morgenthau’s realist theory is the concept of power or “of interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the assumption that political **leaders** “**think and act in terms of interest** defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics. Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. “**Universal moral principles**,” he asserts, “**cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation**, but …they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (ibid.). Prudence, and not conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superiority, should guide political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea that **all state actors**, including our own, **must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests** defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue policies that respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its own. Insofar as power, or interest defined as power, is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration. While Morgenthau’s six principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or **interest is the central concept that makes politics into an autonomous discipline**. **Rational state actors pursue their national interests**. **Therefore**, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual political leaders. It also indicates that **in order to avoid conflicts**, **states should avoid moral crusades** or ideological confrontations, **and look for compromise based solely on satisfaction of their mutual interests**. Although he defines politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the Machiavellian route of completely removing ethics from politics. He suggests that, although human beings are political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral animals. Deprived of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or sub-humans. Even if it is not guided by universal moral principles, political action thus has for Morgenthau a moral significance. Ultimately directed toward the objective of national survival, it also involves prudence. The effective protection of citizens’ lives from harm is not merely a forceful physical action; it has prudential and moral dimensions. Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism. **International politics**, like all politics, **is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power**. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by education. Morgenthau himself reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality. A rational foreign policy is considered “to be a good foreign policy” (7). But **he defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their ability to maximize power**. Statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can result in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing benefits. Hence, rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and the rationality of this pursuit, and sets it up as a norm. As Raymond Aron and other scholars have noticed, power, the fundamental concept of Morgenthau’s realism, is ambiguous. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international politics in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to understand the actions of states independently from the motives and ideological preferences of their political leaders. It cannot serve as the basis for defining politics as an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau’s principles of realism are thus open to doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their regime, pursue the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign policies of Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power? “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very instructive” (598). Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to power, security or national interest. International politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical and cultural context. Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations, their realism can also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them, rather than by moralizing. Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, influential representatives of the new political realism, a movement in contemporary political theory, criticize what they describe as “political moralism” and stress the autonomy of politics against ethics. However, political theory realism and international relations realism seem like two separate research programs. As noted by several scholars (William Scheuerman, Alison McQueen, Terry Nardin. Duncan Bell), those who contribute to realism in political theory give little attention to those who work on realism in international politics.

#### 3. **Nations must pursue self-interest to avoid the dangers of other predatory nations. Moral nations perish like a dog. Bowie 77:**

Bowie, Norman E., and Robert L. Simon. The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977. Print.

In addition to the consequentialist argument, realists often advance a Hobbesian argument as well, designed to show that it is morally permissible for states to promote their national interest even when it might conflict with moral concerns. According to the Hobbesian argument, since descriptive political realism is true, international affairs closely resemble the state of nature as described by Hobbes. Just as individuals in the Hobbesian state of nature act egoistically in the pursuit of wealth and glory, so too do nations act egoistically in the pursuit of national interest. Accordingly, since each nation acts selfishly, no nation can have any reason to expect other nations to behave morally towards it. But then any nation that did act [acting] morally would be making itself vulnerable to [predation]. predatory nations. As Morganthau maintains, “a foreign policy guided by universal moral principles…relegating the national interest to the background is under contemporary conditions…a policy of national suicide actual or potential.” Since morality does not require extreme self-sacrifice, although it may permit it, morality cannot require nations to sacrifice national interest to universal principles in a world where other nations are not prepared to do the sam

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the principals of international realism. This entails that nations only act, and should only act in their own interests, and do not have any outside obligations.

### Definitions

#### “Obligation” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary

Which A, xx-xx-xxxx, "What is OBLIGATION? definition of OBLIGATION (Black's Law Dictionary)," Law Dictionary, http://thelawdictionary.org/obligation/

An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing. Civ. Code Cal.

### Observations

#### 1. The resolution asks the affirmative to prove the existence of an obligation in the status quo, not the desirability of world with development assistance. Negating does not remove development assistance and affirming does not increase it.

#### 2. Desirability creates incentive, not obligation.

### Resolutional Framing

#### 5 dictionary sources define negate as “to deny the truth of”, which means the sole burden of the negative is to prove the resolution’s falsity. Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution. The resolution doesn’t prescribe an action to change the status quo in any way so generating a comparative world for evaluation is logically impossible.

[<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>]

## Part 2 is Offense

#### 1. Development assistance is a que et bono capitalist investment for donor countries, not an obligation. Williams 17:

Williams, Zoe. “The UK Peddles A Cynical Colonialism And Calls It Aid.” The Guardian. July 23, 2017. Web. October 08, 2017. .

States do invest in the infrastructure of other states: the Chinese in our nuclear industry, for instance, the French in our energy, the Germans in our railways. It is perceived, on the right, as an inevitable and generative consequence of globalisation, and on the left as a crying shame that the principle of nationalisation still holds, only our own nation gets none of the benefit. What neither side would claim was that the investment was undertaken as a favour to us, to “lift us out of poverty”. Yet when we invest in private African agribusiness – DfID spent £600m on this scheme – we do so under the guise of “raising 50 million people out of poverty by 2022”. In fact, it was a for-profit venture that did nothing of the sort: the UN rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier de Schutter, found that it had exacerbated land insecurity among smallholders and accelerated seed privatisation. The UK aid watchdog, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, had a slightly kinder reading, that [said] it was “little more than a means of promotion for the companies involved and a chance to increase their influence in policy debates”. This is, through any lens, investment in the privatisation of another nation’s infrastructure. You can defend or promote it on the same economic grounds as the Chinese might defend their interest in Hinkley Point, but to dress it up as benevolence is critically damaging to the good faith of the British internationalist project. In rhetorical and logical terms, it returns us to the age of justifying a colonial land grab on the grounds that we were arriving with the “gift of capitalism and development”.

#### Their own evidence highlights a need for greater aid to solve status quo harms, but that will not happen under the current neoliberal world order because states have no motivation to give more because it would not disproportionately benefit them, that’s Karpowicz and Bowie from my framework. Therefore, the affirmative can never meet their own bright line for solvency.

#### 2. Target driven aid allows developed countries to exploit developing countries for future profits. Dawson 09:

DAWSON, PAMELA-SUZANNE. “Does Foreign Aid Benefit The Poor? Discuss Using Any Case In Africa As Illustration.” E-International Relations Students. August 13, 2009. Web. October 08, 2017. .

Perhaps the most significant development in foreign aid during the past sixty years has been the introduction of target driven aid. The DAC announced that donor governments should provide 1% of their Gross National Income (GNI) in aid[37]. However, this total is inclusive of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which has prompted many African states to become disillusioned with the prospect of aid[38]. FDI was viewed as the opposite of what the likes of President Truman wanted aid to be. It allowed foreign investors to control the domestic resources, employ their own people, and potentially exploit the local market rather than contributing to sustainable economic growth[39]. Many African leaders and supporters claim that FDI will not provide any benefits to the local people because there is no local infrastructure and that this needs to be addressed before any more resources are squandered for the benefit of donors[40]. This has been particularly relevant to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

#### The affirmative may highlight cherry picked benefits of development assistance, but in reality, it is being used to privatize industries in developing nations that will leave them void of domestically owned infrastructure that will ensure long term sustainability. This turns the affirmatives case as the benefits they promise are farces that maintain economic domination by wealthy nations. Also prefer because econ is the internal link to other forms of development.

# 1NR

## \*Blocks

### Morality

#### 1. Nations do not have moral intentionality. Gerson 02:

Having said this, I still think that the argument that seeks to include nations within the class of moral agents on the basis of intentionality is a weak one. Here is why. There is an ambiguity in the term “intentionality” that this argument exploits. In the sense in which nations have intentionality, the attribution of moral agency does not follow. In the sense of intentionality according to which moral agency does follow, this argument does not show that nations have that. **Intentionality in the first sense can characterize any goal-directed behavior** and can also be applied to any behavior that is understandable in the light of that goal. **For example**, it is perfectly reasonable to say that **a squirrel is gathering nuts for the purpose of eating throughout the winter**, or that the rattle of the snake’s tail shows that it intends to strike, or that the field mouse is trying to get into the house in the autumn in order to keep warm, or that the chess-playing robot is trying to pin down my knight. **But th[is] sense of intentionality** that applies to such goal-directed behavior by agents **obviously does not indicate moral agency. Intentionality** in the second sense, the sense according to which its applicability does imply moral agency, is something else. In this sense, intentionality refers first and foremost to the self-awareness of the presence of the purpose and the self-awareness of the mental states leading to its realization. That is, of course, precisely why we refrain from claiming that someone is responsible for [their]her actions when [they are]- she is unaware of what [they are] she is doing, especially when [they] she could not have been aware. The acknowledgement of self-awareness is necessary for the attribution of moral agency. I would in fact argue that all and only nondefective human beings have this ability to be self-aware. But that is not my point here. There may be agents other than human beings that are moral agents. My present point is that a group of human beings, such as the group that comprise a nation, cannot be self-aware in this way and therefore cannot be a moral agent.

#### 2. The body of a state cannot be self-aware, even if the people who comprise the body are. Thus, nations cannot be moral agents. The impact is that we can’t assume states have any moral obligations. Goodman 3:

Aristotle, , Benjamin Jowett, and H W. C. Davis. Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1920. Print.

**If nations are not moral agents**, then **it is a** sort of **category mistake to suppose that nations have moral obligations or rights or duties**, or that they can bear moral guilt or blame. Many people who would concede this claim strictly conceived would maintain that, nevertheless, it is desirable or even inevitable that we adopt the fiction that allows us to make moral judgments about the “citizens” of the community of nations. I suppose that this fiction is not entirely insidious, so long as it is agreed that all the claims about moral duties, obligations, rights, and so forth, made in regard to nations are fictions, too. Thus, for example, **to claim that one nation has an obligation to ameliorate the circumstances of another nation (or its members) is to implicate oneself in a fiction**. **The truth of this assertion is not**, so far as I can see, affected by the hypothetical truth of another assertion; namely, that each and every human being has an obligation to ameliorate the circumstances of every other being insofar as possible. It is not **affected even if we concede that nations, like other groups, can have interests. If,** for example, **one acknowledges in oneself an obligation to serve the interests of the Jewish people, it does not follow from this that one’s own nation has an obligation to support Israel.** Indeed, more to the point, in my view the latter claim is unintelligible.

#### 3. Nations do not possess intentionality, so they cannot be moral agents. This is an independent reason to vote neg because the act of affirming the resolution requires that the state take moral action which they categorically cannot do.

### I-Law

#### 1. Traditional understandings of international law do not obligate development assistance. Macklem 14:

Macklem 14, Patrick. [Patrick Macklem is the William C. Graham Professor of Law and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.] “Global Poverty and the Right to Development in International Law.” International Law Journal of London. July 2014.

International law, traditionally understood, has little to say about global poverty. It imposes legal obligations on states to provide their citizens with access to a set of basic social resources such as food, shelter, basic income, health care, and education. In the name of poverty reduction, most, if not all developed states also provide development assistance in the form of bilateral loans, grants, debt relief to developing states, and make contributions to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank as well as regional development banks which in turn provide various forms of development assistance to recipient states. However, international law is not understood as requiring a state to address poverty beyond its borders. It comprehends bilateral and multilateral development assistance in charitable terms. Global – as opposed to domestic – poverty historically has been as possessing no international legal significance.

### U.S Spec Case Offense

#### 1. Any political motivations in giving aid are short lived- coercion by aid doesn’t work simply. Huntington 10:

Huntington , Samuel. “Foreign Aid: For What And For Whom.” Foreign Policy. December 30, 2010. Web. October 08, 2017. .

Finally, the political argument for U.S. help for Third World economic development is that the current poor countries are going to develop economically by hook or by crook anyway, and that it is in the long-term interest of the U.S. to help them in order to win their friendship and understanding or at least to minimize the bitterness which a failure to aid them would engender. On the surface, this argument has a persuasive simplicity to it, and one can think of cases (U.A.R., Cuba) where U.S. refusal to give aid probably contributed to subsequent hostility towards the U.S. But as with most commonsensical propositions, there is also a commonsensical counterproposition. How many times have we heard that one cannot buy friends by giving them aid, that it is a mistake to think that other people are going to like us because we help them, that such relationships are more likely to breed feelings of resentment, guilt, and frustration on both sides? More generally, the gratitude of nations and governments is normally a transient thing at best, and is apt to approximate the classic expression of the ward heeler to the political boss: “But what have you done for me lately?” The country, after all, which received more U.S. aid than any other, France, was hardly a model ally for many years thereafter. On the other hand, insofar as the governments of both rich and poor countries expect the United States to demonstrate an interest in the economic development of poor countries, the U.S. may well have a political interest in demonstrating such an interest in order to avoid the critical opinions and antagonistic behavior which might result if such expectations were disappointed. This derived or secondary political interest could lead the U.S. to promote such development even if the direct political benefits which might result there from were minimally positive or minimally negative.

### Peace corps

#### The Peace core has murky accounting and allocate resources ineffectively. Rommann 13:

Ryan Rommann, 11-21-2013, "The Peace Corps: out-dated and out-performed?," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/21/peace-corps-us-development-policy

"I am a Peace Corps volunteer." Like 98% of Returned Peace Corps volunteers, I was proud to declare this and believed my two year service was worthwhile. I grew professionally, personally, and did some good. But the programme is broken in many ways. Over 210,000 Americans have served as volunteers in 139 countries since the programme's founding in 1961. John F Kennedy envisioned the Peace Corps as a call to service for qualified Americans to venture abroad and help developing countries. It represented an idealised humanitarianism in a time of cold war tensions and racial segregation. Today, over a half century later, neither the sentiment nor the programme itself have changed. If the Peace Corps is to improve and meet its admirable ambitions, it must be rigorously evaluated, adapted and abandon some of its core beliefs. The programme's mission is "to promote world peace and friendship." Clearly only the crass would denounce such universal aspirations, but they do not withstand scrutiny. "Promoting friendship" is a vapid slogan considering the anti-US sentiment in former Peace Corps posts like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran and Venezuela. Its mission is broken into three goals: providing skilled assistance, promoting mutual understanding of America and the peoples of recipient countries. But fewer than one-third of returning volunteers are confident they achieved the goals and only 25% think the assignments were well defined, according to a 2011 report by the National Peace Corps Association. "The Peace Corps is guilty of enthusiasm and a crusading spirit," in the words of the first programme director, Sargent Shriver. Exuberance is ill spent if poorly aimed. To improve, the Peace Corps must define when a country's mission is accomplished and design an exit strategy to obtain it. Surely development workers aim to render their jobs obsolete? Yet the Peace Corps still has a presence in countries that do not require outside assistance. Out of the 68 currently active countries, 20 countries have high human development, 29 have medium human development, and 19 have low human development on the UN's Human Development Report. With stressed budgets and so many countries in need of assistance, it's regrettable that limited resources are allocated to countries that have already achieved the Peace Corps' first goal. Resource allocation and achievements need auditing. Currently, results are primarily assessed internally by volunteers in biannual reports. These self-assessments rely on introspection rather than sophisticated statistical and cost-benefit analysis. While many development organisations are moving to programme evaluation based on randomised control trials, there is a complete absence of empiricism in the Peace Corps. This is not for a lack of measurement opportunities, given that 76% of volunteers work in education, health, and economic development – sectors perfectly apt for quantitative analysis. While the dearth of objective research may be due to funding shortages, perhaps the Peace Corps avoids assessment for fear of tepid results. It is not just the mission of the Peace Corps that needs to be reworked but how it is staffed. According to its own 2010 assessment, approximately 85% of the agency's volunteers are recent college graduates with little or no professional experience. While a college degree was sufficient to qualify as expertise in the 1960s, it is not satisfactory now. Tertiary enrolment is above 50% in many countries with a Peace Corps presence (eg 82% in Ukraine), compared to single digit enrolment in the 1960s. Sending fresh Philosophy and English majors to help countries "meet their needs for trained people" is patronising at best. The developing world is now better trained and so too should today's volunteers. At best, Peace Corps succeeds at goals 2 and 3 – cultural exchange – but it is unwilling to embrace this success fully, for fear that government funding for a glorified semester abroad will be challenged. It lobbies Washington for funding as a development organisation, but congratulates itself as an international social club. As former country director, Robert Strauss puts it, Peace Corps is a "schizophrenic entity, unsure if it is a development organisation, a cheerleader for international goodwill, or a government-sponsored cross-cultural exchange program". None of this is to say the Peace Corps needs budget tightening. Its $377m (£234m) budget is a rounding error compared to most government spending. The Peace Corps should not be targeted for cuts when $500m a year is spent on marching bands and the entire 50-year budget of Peace Corps amounts to 5 days of current military spending. Yet is the $46,700 it spends a year per volunteer immaterial compared to the 10 cent ORS treatment to save children dying of dehydration? The Peace Corps owes it to them to be better. As John Kennedy explained, "By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it."

#### Culteral exchange via the peace corps is only beneficial to the U.S and is ineffective abroad due to inexperienced volunteers. Straus 08:

Robert L. Strauss, 4-22-2008, "Think Again: The Peace Corps," Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2008/04/22/think-again-the-peace-corps/

No. With diplomats stuck inside barricaded compounds or loath to venture from expatriate residential ghettos, a Peace Corps volunteer is likely to be the only representative of the U.S. government that poor, rural populations ever see. As the State Department cuts back on its public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs, the Peace Corps predominantly young volunteers wind up carrying more and more of the responsibility for demonstrating that the United States still has good intentions abroad. That puts the Peace Corps and its volunteers in an awkward position. The Peace Corps was created as a separate, independent agency so that it would not be subject to short-term foreign-policy objectives. Volunteers arent trained or expected to represent the U.S. government, its positions, or its interests. When the Peace Corps is characterized as an effective diplomatic weapon, it is thanks to the goodwill that volunteers generate toward the American people, not toward official U.S. policy. Unfortunately, of the tens of millions of people with whom Peace Corps volunteers have interacted during the last 47 years, many have no idea what the Peace Corps is. Few have any idea that the Peace Corps is a U.S. government agency funded 100 percent by American taxpayers. On the plus side, over my five years as a country director in Cameroon, hundreds of villagers and officials told me how happy they were simply to have volunteers in their communities. Less encouraging is that just as often, I was told how fondly they remembered the Peace Corps volunteer from Rome, Paris, or Tokyo. Its tough to be an effective diplomatic weapon and build goodwill among nations if people dont understand what nation you came from in the first place.

## Extensions

### FDI Turn

**Local ownership of projects is key to provision of effective development assistance. Aksli 17:**  
(Marje - Marje Aksli is an independent evaluation consultant based in Washington, DC, focusing on international development and security programming. Her interests include the impact of global governance on policy-making, "Canada’s feminist international assistance risks not being relevant to its development partners and not enjoying strong local ownership.", Policy Options, 10/16/17, [policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2017/feminist-international-assistance-may-not-be-effective/](http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2017/feminist-international-assistance-may-not-be-effective/))

However, the first principle of effective foreign aid is that development needs to be locally owned. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted in 2005, clearly states that developing countries are supposed to set their own strategies for poverty reduction, and the donor countries are expected to align behind these objectives and to use local systems. It’s difficult to imagine that the countries with the gravest conditions for women will “own” feminism, a Western concept. Evaluators assessing foreign aid programming for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability — the criteria set by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development — know that the projects that are implemented with low levels of local ownership are less likely to be sustainable after the donor funding is withdrawn. Feminism has to be relevant to Canada’s development partners, and it would need to be reflected in their governments’ poverty reduction strategies. Additionally, achieving outcomes that are in serious disagreement with local traditions ends up being less efficient economically than running projects that enjoy strong local ownership. Potentially low relevance, high inefficiency and low long-term sustainability mean that development interventions cannot be considered effective. The second set of problems related to feminist development initiatives is associated with impact and attribution. In the near future, can Canada truly credibly claim that any success in the partner countries was due to our feminist development interventions, and not caused by other favourable trends beyond Canada’s control? The truth is that social norms guiding the behaviour of men and women have evolved across centuries, following a local logic, and they relate to people’s innate mindset. They are “sticky”: outsiders’ efforts to change ways of life by rearranging power relationships are doomed to fail if they do not follow the local logic. Tinkering with gender relations is not viewed universally as bringing benefits to everyone. Some high-powered men might perceive Canada’s well-meaning efforts as threatening, and they are not likely to support feminist policies that come from abroad. And yet they are also stakeholders in development, interested in maintaining or increasing their prestige or status in their respective societies.

#### Development assistance supplants local independence and the development of industries within recipient countries, pushing them to become dependent on foreign aid. Stanford 15:

Stanford 15, Victoria. [University of Edinburgh]. “Aid Dependency: The Damage of Donation,” This Week in Global Health, 7/31/2015. https://www.twigh.org/ twigh-blog-archives/2015/7/31/aid-dependency-the-damage-of-donation

Aid has long been the response of richer countries to the imbalance of economic development seen across the globe. In the last two decades however, relatively non-intrusive in-kind giving has been re-branded and intensified to the point where aid today is arguably used as a strategic force in increasingly interventionist global development policy. The aid industry has seen a rapid expansion, characterised by an increase in the number of organisations, amounts of funding and geographical reach (Collinson and Duffied, 2013). The question of aid dependence is an important one; many argue that international assistance paradoxically poses a barrier to recipient country development and sustainable economic growth (Moyo, 2009). Recent rhetoric surrounding aid dependency is clear- it is an unwelcome and unfortunate side effect of aid and its diminishment is high on the aid policy agenda (Thomas et al., 2011). What is becoming increasingly clear however is that there is an emerging type of aid-related dependency that does not refer to economic or financial factors, but political. Cases of corruption in recipient country governments have been met with the development of more complex modes of donation, including direct programme funding, conditionalities, tied aid, and grants, which give donors more control over the direction and ultimate use of their funds. This often means that those providing aid are increasingly entwined in political processes. This combined with aid uncertainty, questionable sustainability, and a tendency of topdown approaches to political involvement, create a situation where countries in need of aid are dependent upon foreign agendas. How has aid caused dependency? Aid dependency refers to the proportion of government spending that is given by foreign donors. Since 2000 this has in fact decreased by one third in the world’s poorest countries, exemplified by Ghana and Mozambique where aid dependency decreased from 47% to 27% and 74% to 58% respectively (3). Aid is not intrinsically linked to dependency; studies have shown that dependency is influenced by many factors, mostly length and intensity of the donation period, and 15-20% has been identified as the tipping point where aid begins to have negative effects (Clemens et al., 2012). What causes dependency is when aid is used, intentionally or not, as a long-term strategy that consequently inhibits development, progress, or reform. Food aid is particularly criticised for this; increasing dependency on aid imports disincentivises local food production by reducing market demand. This is compounded when declining aid is replaced with commercial imports rather than locally-sourced food, either because of cheaper prices or a lack of recipient country food production capacity because of long-term aid causing agricultural stagnation (Shah, 2012). This is exemplified in the situation of Haiti, which is dependent on cheap US imports for over 80% of grain stocks even in a post-aid era, or countries such as the Philippines where aid dependency has forced an over-reliance on cash crops. Dependency relates not only to commodities but also technical expertise and skills which donors often bring to specific aid schemes and projects, which when not appropriately coupled with education create an over-reliance on donors (Thomas et al., 2011).

### International Realism

#### 1. STATES INEVITABLY COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER FOR INTERNATIONAL POWER – ANY ATTEMPT TO DEVIATE FROM THIS STRUCTURE CAUSES VIOLENCE -extend bowie 77

#### 2. REALISM MUST BE USED STRATEGICALLY – REJECTING IT RISKS WORSE USES. GUZZINI 98:

Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1998, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non‑option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world‑view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self‑understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.